The cooperation between the different entities of a decentralized prevention system can be solved efficiently using the publish/subscribe communication model. Here, clients can share and correlate alert information about the systems they monitor. In this paper, we present the advantages and convenience in using this communication model for a general decentralized prevention framework. Additionally, we outline the design for a specific architecture, and evaluate our design using a freely available publish/subscribe message oriented middleware.
Introduction
Both, distributed and coordinated attacks, rely on the combination of actions performed by a malicious adversary to violate the security policy of a target computer system. We are currently working on the design and development of an attack prevention framework that is targeted at detecting as well as reacting to such attack scenarios [4] . Our approach is based on gathering and correlating information held by multiple sources. To share alerts, we use a decentralized scheme based on message passing.
The communication between the different sources in our approach has been solved in an efficient way by using the publish/subscribe communication paradigm. A publish/subscribe system consists of brokers and clients that are connected to brokers. The brokers themselves form the infrastructure (notification service) used for notification routing. Clients can publish notifications and/or subscribe to filters that are matched against the notifications passing through the broker network. If a broker receives a new noti-fication it checks if there is a local client that has subscribed to a filter that matches this notification. If so, the message is delivered to this client. Next, the broker forwards the message to other brokers according to the applied routing algorithm.
In this paper, we propose a decentralized infrastructure to share alerts between the components of an attack prevention system. The information exchange between peers is intended to achieve a more complete view of the system in whole. This way, we are able to detect and react on the different steps of a coordinated or distributed attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the advantages and convenience in using the publish/subscribe communication paradigm for our problem domain, comparing our approach to those taken in related work. Then, we discuss and evaluate the communication mechanism used to exchange information between the components of our system using xmlBlaster, an open source publish/subscribe message oriented middleware in Section 3. We close with conlusions in Section 4.
Related Work
Traditional client/server solutions for the prevention of distributed and coordinated attacks can quickly become a bottleneck due to saturation problems associated with the service offered by centralized or master domain analyzers.
Centralized systems, such as DIDS [11] and NADIR [5] , process their data in a central node although the collection of data itself is distributed. These schemes are straightforward as they simply send the collected data to a central node, where the actual processing is performed.
Hierarchical approaches, such as GrIDS [12] and Net-STAT [13] , have a layered structure where data is locally preprocessed and filtered. This way, they mitigate some weaknesses present in centralized schemes, but they still cannot avoid bottlenecks, scalability problems and fault tolerance vulnerabilities at the root level.
Current approaches try to eliminate the need for dedicated elements by distributing the detection process. This approach has some advantages over centralized and hierarchical approaches. Mainly, this is because decentralized architectures have no single point of failure and bottlenecks can be avoided.
Some message passing designs, such as CSM [14] and Quicksand [6] , try to eliminate the need for dedicated elements by introducing a peer-to-peer architecture. Instead of having a central monitoring station to which all data has to be forwarded there are independent uniform working entities at each host performing similar elementary operations. To detect attacks, the indicidual entities collaborate on the detection activities and cooperate to perform a decentralized correlation algorithm.
These designs seem to be promising for implementing a decentralized architecture for the detection of (distributed) attacks. However, they still exhibit very simplistic designs and suffer from several limitations. For instance, in some of them, every node has to have complete knowledge of the system: all nodes have to be connected to each other which can make the matrix of the connections, that are used for providing the alert exchanging service, grow exponentially and become very costly to control and maintain.
Another important disadvantage inherent to these designs is that the different entities always need to know where a notification received has to be forwarded -similar to a queue manager. Hence, when the number of possible destinations grows, the network view can become extremely complex, which again may lead to scalability problems. Other designs are based on flooding making the system easy to maintain. This solution obviously still lacks of scalability, as the message complexity grows fast with the number of brokers. Most of these limitations can be efficiently solved by means of a publish/subscribe based system.
The advantage of the publish/subscribe model over other communication paradigms for our problem domain is that it keeps the producer of messages separated from the consumer(s) and that the communication itself is informationdriven. This model can avoid problems regarding the scalability and the mangagement inherent to other designs, by means of a network of publishers, brokers, and subscribers. A publisher in a publish/subscribe system does not need to have any knowledge about any of the entities that consume the published information. Likewise, the subscribers do not need to know anything about the publishers. New services can simply be added without any impact on or interruption of the service to other users.
Alert Communication Infrastructure
In this section, we describe the alert communication infrastructure and details of our implementation. The infrastructure basically consists of a set of nodes which are connected by a network and exchange alerts using the publish/subscribe communication paradigm. As we do not want to develop yet another publish/subscribe system, we try to reuse as much available code and tools as possible.
For our experiments we use xmlBlaster, an open source publish/subscribe message oriented middleware [10] . The alerts are formulated using XML as xmlBlaster uses this format for its message syntax [1] . Each message consists of a header filtering can be applied to, a body, and a system control section. Filters are XPath expressions [2] that are evaluated over the header to decide if a message has to be delivered to a subscriber.
Interface Operations
The alert communication infrastructure offered by xml-Blaster can be viewed as a black box with an interface. It offers a number of operations, each of which may take a number of parameters. Clients can invoke input operations from the outside and the system itself invokes output operations to deliver information to the clients. As pointed out in [9] , these input and output operations can be formally described using linear temporal logic [7] . To publish alerts, clients invoke the pub(a) operation, giving the alert a as parameter. The published alert can potentially be delivered to all connected clients via an output operation called notify(a). Clients register their interest in specific kinds of alerts by issuing subscriptions via the sub(F ) operation, which takes a filter F as parameter. Each client can have multiple active subscriptions which must be revoked separately by using the unsub(F ) operation.
All these operations are instantaneous and take parameters from the set of all clients C, the set of all alerts A, and the set of all filters F. Formally, a filter F ∈ F is a mapping from A to the boolean values true and false. Hence, a notication n matches filter F ∈ F iff F (a) evaluates to true. Additionally, we also assume that each alert can only be published once, and that every filter is associated with a unique identifier in order to enable the alert communication infrastructure to identify a specific subscription.
Each node in the architecture is made up of a set of local analyzers (with their respective detection units or sensors), and a set of alert managers (to perform alert processing and manipulation functions). These components and the interactions between them are described below.
Analyzers
Analyzers are local elements which are responsible for processing audit data. They process the information gathered by associated sensors to infer possible alerts. Their task is to identify occurrences which are relevant to the execution of the different steps of an attack and pass this information to the correlation manager via the publish/subscribe system. The relevant occurrences are local alerts. Each local alert is detected in a sensor's input stream and published through the publish/subscribe system by invoking the pub(la) operation, giving the notification la (local alert) as parameter.
Each local alert notification (la) has a unique classification, and a list of attributes with their respective types, to identify the analyzer that originated the alert (AnalyzerID), the time the alert was created (CreateTime), the time the event(s) leading up to the alert was detected in the sensor's input stream (DetectTime), the current time on the analyzer (An-alyzerTime), and the source(s) and target(s) of the event(s) (Source and Target). All possible classifications and their respective attributes must be known by all system components (i.e. sensors, analyzers and managers). The analyzers are capable to publish various instances of local alerts of one or more types.
The local alerts are exchanged as IDMEF messages [3] , and formulated using XML syntax [1] . The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) is intended to be a standard data format that automated intrusion detection systems can use to raise alerts about events that they report as suspicious. It allows analyzers and managers to assemble very complex alert descriptions.
Managers
Using heterogeneous detection techniques increases the detection rate, but it also increases the number of alerts to process. This is a trade-off that comes up when deploying multiple analyzers and sensors. In order to facilitate the detection process and to reduce the number of false negatives our architecture provides a set of cooperation and correlation managers, which perform aggregation and correlation of both, local alerts (i.e., messages provided by the node's analyzers) and external messages (i.e., the information received from other collaborating nodes).
The basic task of a cooperation manager is to cluster alerts that correspond to the same occurrence of an action. Each cooperation manager registers its interest in local alerts (L A ) by invoking sub(LA) which takes the filter LA as parameter. The filter LA ∈ F is a mapping from L A ⊆ A (i.e., the subset of alerts published by analyzers of the same node) to true or false. Similarly, the cooperation manager also registers its interest in related external alerts (E A ) by invoking sub(EA), with the filter EA ∈ F as parameter, and its interest in local correlated alerts (C A ) by invoking sub(CA) with the filter CA ∈ F as parameter.
Once subscribed to these three filters, the alert infrastructure will notify of all matching alerts via the output operations notify(la), notify(ea) and notify(ca). All the notified alerts are processed and, depending on the clustering and synchronization functions used, the cooperation manager can publish some global and external alerts by invoking pub(ga) and pub(ea). Finally, it can revoke the active subscriptions separately by using the operations unsub(CA), unsub(EA) and unsub(LA).
The main task of the correlation manager is the execution of the alert correlation algorithm described in [4] . The correlation manager operates on the global alerts (G A ) published by the local cooperation manager. To register its interest in these alerts it invokes the sub(GA) operation, which takes the filter GA ∈ F as parameter. Afterwards, the alert infrastructure will notify it of all matched alerts using the output operations notify(ga).
Each time a new alert is received the correlation mechanism finds a set of action models that can be correlated in order to form a scenario leading to an objective. Finally, it includes this information into the CorrelationAlert field of a new ID-MEF message and publishes it as a correlated alert by invoking pub(ca), giving the notification ca as parameter. To revoke the subscription, it uses the unsub(GA) operation.
Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the implemented alert communication infrastructure for our proposed architecture, we deployed a set of three analyzers publishing ten thousand messages, which are notified as local alerts through the communication infrastructure, and then processed and published in turn to three subscribed managers.
The throughput on the alert communication infrastructure is above 150 messages per second on a Intel-Pentium M (Centrino) processor 1400MHz with 512MB RAM (both, analyzers and managers, on the same machine running Linux 2.6.8, and using Java HotSpot Client VM 1.4.2 for the execution of the java based broker).
Both analyzers and managers are based on the libidmef C library [8] , which is used to build and parse compliant IDMEF messages, and the xmlBlaster client C socket library [10] , which supports access to xmlBlaster with asynchronous callbacks.
In this paper we presented an infrastructure to share alerts between the components of a prevention framework that is targeted at detecting as well as reacting to distributed and coordinated attack scenarios using the publish/subscribe paradigm.
This way we are able to achieve a more complete view of the whole system using the information exchanged between peers, while still maintaing scalability. This is necessary to detect and react in an indirect manner on the different actions of an attack, especially in larger networks.
We also sketched and evaluated a concrete implementation of our mechanism based on xmlBlaster, an open source publish/subscribe message oriented middleware.
As future work we are considering the use of privacy mechanisms to address the exchange of alerts in a pseudonymous manner, i.e. to provide the destination and origin information of alerts without violating the privacy of publishers and subscribers located on different domains.
